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security: fix CVE-2023-48228 (#7666) 

Signed-off-by: Jens Langhammer <jens@goauthentik.io>
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Jens L 2023-11-21 18:10:07 +01:00 committed by GitHub
parent 6a43721524
commit b88e39411c
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4 changed files with 253 additions and 1 deletions
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187
authentik/providers/oauth2/tests/test_token_pkce.py Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,187 @@
"""Test token view"""
from base64 import b64encode, urlsafe_b64encode
from hashlib import sha256
from django.test import RequestFactory
from django.urls import reverse
from authentik.core.models import Application
from authentik.core.tests.utils import create_test_admin_user, create_test_flow
from authentik.flows.challenge import ChallengeTypes
from authentik.lib.generators import generate_id
from authentik.providers.oauth2.constants import GRANT_TYPE_AUTHORIZATION_CODE
from authentik.providers.oauth2.models import AuthorizationCode, OAuth2Provider
from authentik.providers.oauth2.tests.utils import OAuthTestCase
class TestTokenPKCE(OAuthTestCase):
"""Test token view"""
def setUp(self) -> None:
super().setUp()
self.factory = RequestFactory()
self.app = Application.objects.create(name=generate_id(), slug="test")
def test_pkce_missing_in_token(self):
"""Test full with pkce"""
flow = create_test_flow()
provider = OAuth2Provider.objects.create(
name=generate_id(),
client_id="test",
authorization_flow=flow,
redirect_uris="foo://localhost",
access_code_validity="seconds=100",
)
Application.objects.create(name="app", slug="app", provider=provider)
state = generate_id()
user = create_test_admin_user()
self.client.force_login(user)
challenge = generate_id()
header = b64encode(f"{provider.client_id}:{provider.client_secret}".encode()).decode()
# Step 1, initiate params and get redirect to flow
self.client.get(
reverse("authentik_providers_oauth2:authorize"),
data={
"response_type": "code",
"client_id": "test",
"state": state,
"redirect_uri": "foo://localhost",
"code_challenge": challenge,
"code_challenge_method": "S256",
},
)
response = self.client.get(
reverse("authentik_api:flow-executor", kwargs={"flow_slug": flow.slug}),
)
code: AuthorizationCode = AuthorizationCode.objects.filter(user=user).first()
self.assertJSONEqual(
response.content.decode(),
{
"component": "xak-flow-redirect",
"type": ChallengeTypes.REDIRECT.value,
"to": f"foo://localhost?code={code.code}&state={state}",
},
)
response = self.client.post(
reverse("authentik_providers_oauth2:token"),
data={
"grant_type": GRANT_TYPE_AUTHORIZATION_CODE,
"code": code.code,
# Missing the code_verifier here
"redirect_uri": "foo://localhost",
},
HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Basic {header}",
)
self.assertJSONEqual(
response.content,
{"error": "invalid_request", "error_description": "The request is otherwise malformed"},
)
self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 400)
def test_pkce_correct_s256(self):
"""Test full with pkce"""
flow = create_test_flow()
provider = OAuth2Provider.objects.create(
name=generate_id(),
client_id="test",
authorization_flow=flow,
redirect_uris="foo://localhost",
access_code_validity="seconds=100",
)
Application.objects.create(name="app", slug="app", provider=provider)
state = generate_id()
user = create_test_admin_user()
self.client.force_login(user)
verifier = generate_id()
challenge = (
urlsafe_b64encode(sha256(verifier.encode("ascii")).digest())
.decode("utf-8")
.replace("=", "")
)
header = b64encode(f"{provider.client_id}:{provider.client_secret}".encode()).decode()
# Step 1, initiate params and get redirect to flow
self.client.get(
reverse("authentik_providers_oauth2:authorize"),
data={
"response_type": "code",
"client_id": "test",
"state": state,
"redirect_uri": "foo://localhost",
"code_challenge": challenge,
"code_challenge_method": "S256",
},
)
response = self.client.get(
reverse("authentik_api:flow-executor", kwargs={"flow_slug": flow.slug}),
)
code: AuthorizationCode = AuthorizationCode.objects.filter(user=user).first()
self.assertJSONEqual(
response.content.decode(),
{
"component": "xak-flow-redirect",
"type": ChallengeTypes.REDIRECT.value,
"to": f"foo://localhost?code={code.code}&state={state}",
},
)
response = self.client.post(
reverse("authentik_providers_oauth2:token"),
data={
"grant_type": GRANT_TYPE_AUTHORIZATION_CODE,
"code": code.code,
"code_verifier": verifier,
"redirect_uri": "foo://localhost",
},
HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Basic {header}",
)
self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 200)
def test_pkce_correct_plain(self):
"""Test full with pkce"""
flow = create_test_flow()
provider = OAuth2Provider.objects.create(
name=generate_id(),
client_id="test",
authorization_flow=flow,
redirect_uris="foo://localhost",
access_code_validity="seconds=100",
)
Application.objects.create(name="app", slug="app", provider=provider)
state = generate_id()
user = create_test_admin_user()
self.client.force_login(user)
verifier = generate_id()
header = b64encode(f"{provider.client_id}:{provider.client_secret}".encode()).decode()
# Step 1, initiate params and get redirect to flow
self.client.get(
reverse("authentik_providers_oauth2:authorize"),
data={
"response_type": "code",
"client_id": "test",
"state": state,
"redirect_uri": "foo://localhost",
"code_challenge": verifier,
},
)
response = self.client.get(
reverse("authentik_api:flow-executor", kwargs={"flow_slug": flow.slug}),
)
code: AuthorizationCode = AuthorizationCode.objects.filter(user=user).first()
self.assertJSONEqual(
response.content.decode(),
{
"component": "xak-flow-redirect",
"type": ChallengeTypes.REDIRECT.value,
"to": f"foo://localhost?code={code.code}&state={state}",
},
)
response = self.client.post(
reverse("authentik_providers_oauth2:token"),
data={
"grant_type": GRANT_TYPE_AUTHORIZATION_CODE,
"code": code.code,
"code_verifier": verifier,
"redirect_uri": "foo://localhost",
},
HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Basic {header}",
)
self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 200)

5
authentik/providers/oauth2/views/token.py
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@ -222,7 +222,10 @@ class TokenParams:
raise TokenError("invalid_grant")
# Validate PKCE parameters.
if self.code_verifier:
if self.authorization_code.code_challenge:
# Authorization code had PKCE but we didn't get one
if not self.code_verifier:
raise TokenError("invalid_request")
if self.authorization_code.code_challenge_method == PKCE_METHOD_S256:
new_code_challenge = (
urlsafe_b64encode(sha256(self.code_verifier.encode("ascii")).digest())

61
website/docs/security/CVE-2023-48228.md Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
# CVE-2023-48228
_Reported by [@Sapd](https://github.com/Sapd)_
## OAuth2: Insufficient PKCE check
### Summary
When initialising a OAuth2 flow with a `code_challenge` and `code_method` (thus requesting PKCE), the SSO provider (authentik) **must** check if there is a matching **and** existing `code_verifier` during the token step.
authentik checks if the contents of code*verifier is matching \*\*\_ONLY*\*\* when it is provided. When it is left out completely, authentik simply accepts the token request with out it; even when the flow was started with a `code_challenge`.
### Patches
authentik 2023.8.5 and 2023.10.4 fix this issue.
### Details
The `code_verifier` is only checked when the user provides it. Note that in line 209 there is a check if the code_parameter is left out. But there is no check if the PKCE parameter simply was omitted WHEN the request was started with a `code_challenge_method`.
This oversight likely did not stem from a coding error but from a misinterpretation of the RFC, where the backward compatibility section may be somewhat confusing.
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7636#section-4.5
RFC7636 explicitly says in Section 4.5:
> The "code_challenge_method" is bound to the Authorization Code when
> the Authorization Code is issued. That is the method that the token
> endpoint MUST use to verify the "code_verifier".
Section 5, Compatibility
> Server implementations of this specification MAY accept OAuth2.0
> clients that do not implement this extension. If the "code_verifier"
> is not received from the client in the Authorization Request, servers
> supporting backwards compatibility revert to the OAuth 2.0 [[RFC6749](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6749)]
> protocol without this extension.
Section 5, Compatibility, allows server implementations of this specification to accept OAuth 2.0 clients that do not implement this extension. However, if a `code_verifier` is not received from the client in the Authorization Request, servers that support backward compatibility should revert to the standard OAuth 2.0 protocol sans this extension (including all steps).
It should be noted that this does not mean that the `code_verifier` check can be disregarded at any point if the initial request included `code_challenge` or `code_challenge_method`. Since Authentik supports PKCE, it **MUST** verify the code_verifier as described in Section 4.5 **AND** fail if it was not provided.
Ofc verification can be skipped if the original authorization request did not invoke PKCE (no `code_challenge_method` and no `code_challenge`).
Failure to check the `code_verifier` renders the PKCE flow ineffective. This vulnerability particularly endangers public or hybrid clients, as their `code` is deemed non-confidential.
While not explicitly stated in the standard, it is generally recommended that OAuth2 flows accepting public clients should enforce PKCE - at least when redirecting to a non HTTPS URL (like http or an app link).
### Impact
The vulnerability poses a high risk to both public and hybrid clients.
When for example a mobile app implements oauth2, a malicious app can simply also register the same in-app-link (e.g. `mycoolapp://oauth2`) for the redirect callback URL, possibly receiving `code` during callback. With PKCE working, a malicious app would still receive a `code` but the `code` would not work without the correct unhashed code-challenge.
This is especially problematic, because authentik claims to support PKCE, and a developer can expect that the proper checks are in place. Note that app-links cannot be protected by HTTPS or similar mechanisms.
Note also that this vulnerability poses a threat to confidential clients. Many confidential clients act as a proxy for OAuth2 API requests, typically from mobile apps or single-page applications. These proxies relay `code_challenge`, `code_challenge_method` (in auth request, which most libraries force and provide on default settings) and `code_verifier` in the token request unchanged and supplement the CLIENT_SECRET which only the relay knows. The relay can but does not have to check for an existing `code_verifier` as the standard does not define that PKCE can be ignored on confidential clients during the token request when the client requested PKCE during the authorization request.
An attacker could potentially gain full access to the application. If the code grants access to an admin account, the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of that application are compromised.
### For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
- Email us at [security@goauthentik.io](mailto:security@goauthentik.io)

1
website/sidebars.js
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@ -407,6 +407,7 @@ const docsSidebar = {
},
items: [
"security/policy",
"security/CVE-2023-48228",
"security/GHSA-rjvp-29xq-f62w",
"security/CVE-2023-39522",
"security/CVE-2023-36456",